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Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics 
and Its Difficult 'Status Quo' 
Abstract 
Taiwan's growing calls for independence have provoked China and heightened 
the risk of military conflict in the region. This paper addresses two issues: first, 
it seeks to provide a short historical overview of the development of Taiwan- 
ese nationalistic self-assertion; second, it questions the commonly held notion 
of keeping the 'status quo', which is in effect always changing and dynamic. 
The paper uses a historical-institutional framework for its interpretation. It 
explores the origin and rise of Taiwanese nationalism in its relationship to 
Taiwan's past, and the changing geo-political contexts in which it is situated. 
It then analyses the importance of electoral institutions and the struggles to 
broaden political participation and legitimation. Several disparate sources of 
Taiwanese identity are also discussed, namely: (i) Taiwan as a frontier terri- 
tory of the Manchu Empire, which was later colonized and modernized by the 
Japanese; (ii) unification with the Republic of China under authoritarian rule 
since 1945; and (iii) the transformation of the ROC regime, its indigenization 
and grounding in Taiwan in the context of its long separation from China and 
its international isolation. This indigenization process has been gradually ac- 
complished through electoral struggles and by revising the electoral system 
and the con~titution.~ 
Introduction 
The recent growth of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment has caused wide- 
spread alarm and raised the spectre of military conflict in the region. 
It is not that Taiwan's nationalism is expected to lead to strategic or 
territorial expansion, but that in the eyes of the Beijing government, 
it is seen as a 'provocative' step in the direction of 'permanently sepa- 
rating' from China. During the last decade, Beijing's efforts to subdue 
Taiwan's move towards independence, which have included the use 
of military exercises and threatening remarks, have been unsuccessful 
in dampening its growth. Sometimes stern reactions from the PRC vis- 
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a-vis Taiwan's domestic politics just helped to add fuel to the fire. The 
dark cloud of war has been looming since 1996 over the Taiwan Strait 
(Friedman 1999). 
Beijing has offered Taiwan the terms known as 'Peaceful Unifica- 
tion, One Country Two  system^'.^ Very briefly, this means that Taiwan 
could enjoy a very high degree of autonomy, including maintaining its 
military force, but must remain a special territorial government under 
the PRC. Hong Kong was at one time the often-cited model to persuade 
Taiwan to accept this concept, though less so now, partly caused by 
rising discontents among Hong Kong citizens for their government. 
The PRC firmly believe that if Taiwan were to accept this offer, both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait would benefit from a peaceful and prosper- 
ous future, a true 'win-win' situation. One needs to enquire why the 
political trend in Taiwan has been edging in the opposite direction by 
choosing to promote independent sovereign statehood, 'separating' 
from China. Why is it that more and more Taiwanese people and their 
political leaders have, in their political manoeuvrings, continuously 
declined China's unification proposal, and defied China's warning of 
war? Political analysts also wonder why Taiwan does not grasp the op- 
portunity while it still has the chance, since time is on the side of China, 
whose economy is booming and which is swiftly rising to become the 
major regional player. 
One simple answer to these questions is that Taiwanese nationalism 
is 'protected' by the US in the name of maintaining peace in the region 
and defending democracy. In the eyes of its opponents, Taiwan has 
been regarded as the 'protectorate' of the US since the 1950s, when the 
Korean War broke out. At that time, Taiwan was occasionally referred 
to as an 'unsinkable' carrier of the West Pacific to contain the spread 
of communism. And now it is vital to the strategic interests of the Ja- 
pan-US alliance in the region to balance and check the surging Chinese 
influence. Despite its affirmation of the 'One-China' policy, and its as- 
sertion that it does not support Taiwanese independence, the US has a 
vested interest in a 'separate' Taiwan, especially when engaging with 
China. Opponents of Taiwanese nationalism question its authenticity, 
and believe that without US backing, Taiwan would have lost its status 
quo and caved in very quickly. 
From the viewpoint of realpolitik, this explanation may not be far from 
reality. But this is also an oversimplistic view because it takes little ac- 
count of what the citizens of Taiwan actually practise in their routine 
political life: namely what the concepts of 'democracy' and 'nation', 
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'independence' and 'unification' actually mean to them for their identity- 
making process. It also overlooks how different historical trajectories 
and political institutions have exerted various influences on Taiwan's 
nationalism and capacity for self-assertion, and how this has ironically 
divided and united Taiwan at one and the same time. 
It is fair to argue that Taiwan has developed its own zig-zag na- 
tion-building course under the geo-political constraints set by global 
and regional powers beyond its borders. Though the nation has many 
adversaries, including the recent threat of incursion by China, Taiwan 
is de facto an independent country. Indeed, in 2003 it ranked as the 17th 
largest trade country of the world, boasting a fully-fledged democracy 
and government. Though it does not have enough power to shake up 
the big geo-political picture, significant events do take place within 
Taiwan's domestic political agenda, such as combining a disputed ref- 
erendum with a heated presidential election at the same time, proposing 
to revise its constitution and its national title, lobbying to enter UN as 
a nation-state at the Assembly, and revising the curricular of history 
and geography in national education contents. All these developments 
have the potential to exert a significant pressure on concerned parties 
and people, both inside and outside of Taiwan, and to impact on its 
neighbouring countries through 'provoking' Chinese military actions 
and hence forcing the US and Japan to take a stand on the issue. 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to provide a 'balanced' inter- 
pretative framework to examine Taiwanese politics and its significance. 
The paper attempts to look at issues that concern many Taiwanese, and 
explain why have they been occupying a salient position in Taiwan's 
political arena.3 I contend that Taiwan's nationalistic drive has its origin 
in the complex and powerful functions and influences of colonialism, 
nationalism and the state apparatus. The pursuance of national mod- 
ernization and development has been confined to geo-politics. And 
nationalism, be it Taiwanese or Chinese, has been a crucial element 
in the institutional formulation of the ROC's constitution and in the 
evolution of its electoral politics. It cannot be discredited as political 
manoeuvring and strategic mobilization by some cunning political 
elites and opportunist political parties. Nationalism, once it has arisen, 
develops and transforms itself through major events and critical his- 
torical conjunctures. Its capacity to grow is also constrained by the 
range of probable actions set by the constraints in institutional politics. 
According to its relative strength at a particular juncture, it may either 
follow or contravene the rules of the game imposed at that time by 
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powerful interests. Thus its developmental course is often non-linear 
and not predetermined; rather it is path-dependent, meaning that the 
latter developments are led and influenced by earlier developments or 
events with a degree of uncertainty. 
The framework of this paper will be mainly historical-institutional. I 
wish to demonstrate the impact of the past on the present, and that the 
present can only play itself out within the boundaries set by the past. 
In other words, when political change takes place, it tends to occur in- 
crementally, unless the power structure or major institutions have been 
seriously disrupted. Moreover, incremental changes, some big and some 
small, are also completed through the pre-existing institutional set-ups. 
Besides regulating the possibilities and providing rationalizations for 
political actions, institutional set-ups are also situated at the centre-stage 
of contentious politics, becoming the target for political struggles. Thus 
they constrain and energize political changes almost simultaneously. 
The first part of this paper explores the historical background of Tai- 
wanese national self-assertion. For most people, trying to make sense 
of the present and look toward the future, the past can provide ration- 
alization~ and meanings either through direct lived experience (of the 
older generation) or through narrating and using the past to educate 
the younger generation. What we see in today's Taiwanese nationalism 
has a long historical trajectory, originated in its colonial legacy of the 
early 20th century. This legacy persists in the current political scenario, 
and is repeatedly narrated by today's political actors. The paper then 
focuses on three major sources of political energy to explain Taiwan's 
drive for nationalism and independence: (i) the early phase of Taiwanese 
national self-assertion under the Japanese, (ii) the historic building of 
nationalist authoritarianism in Taiwan by the ROC government, and 
(iii) the movement from the grassroots to transform the regime into 
a representative polity through the struggles to enlarge the existing 
electoral system and for 'political indigenization'. But first, it is helpful 
briefly to examine the current complexities surrounding the issue of 
nationalism in Taiwan. 
The Complexities of the Current National Status 
Figure 1 gives an indication of the range of Taiwanese attitudes (1998- 
2004) towards Taiwan independence versus unification with China. Over 
the years, compared to other choices, over 50 percent of the Taiwanese 
public favours preservation of the 'status quo'. The majority view helps 
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to stabilize the current regime and to inject a degree of self-restraint 
in domestic politics, as against any hasty move. The corresponding 
percentages for the pro-independence camp, consisting of those who 
want independence as soon as possible, and those who perhaps would 
prefer independence at some future date, have increased steadily in 
recent years, from under 20 percent to almost 26 percent. But the sup- 
port for immediate independence is still relative low, hovering around 
5-6 percent. On the other hand, the support for unification with China 
shows a more fluctuating and declining percentage. A recent 2004 poll 
suggests that about 11.4 percent favour unification some time in the 
future, with only 1.6 percent opting for immediate unification. 
FIGURE 1: Opinion Poll (1998-2004) on whether Taiwan Should Seek 
Independence or Unification with China (%) 
Status quo now/ 
decide later 
+E- For status quo 
indefinitely 
Status quo now/ 
independence later 
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unification later 
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-0- Others 
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Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, and Taiwanese Government. The data 
were collected through telephone interviews by random sampling of the national adult 
population. The poll was done by the Center for Election Studies, National Cheng-Chi 
University, Taiwan, and a private polling company. 
Another way to explain the complexity is to look at the formation 
of the 'status quo' in Taiwan. For many Chinese, the term 'China' is so 
natural that it appears to be unequivocal and seemingly eternal. But in 
reality and in history, 'China' has many different faces and meanings 
to different peoples. And the territory and people of 'China' through- 
out history have also varied according to the period in question. To 
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explain just how complicated the issue of national identity is in Taiwan 
today; we can begin with its official title and constitution. The official 
title of Taiwan today is still the Republic of China (the ROC), which 
was established in 1911 in Nanjing (in Mainland China), following the 
overthrow of the Manchu monarchy. And the constitution of ROC was 
passed only towards the end of 1948 in Nanjing a few months before 
the fall of the Nationalist government. This event occurred during the 
period of heightened civil war between the government and the 'rebel' 
communist army. Later, that constitution was taken to Taiwan when 
the central government went into exile. Never fully implemented (for 
obvious practical reasons), the constitution became a token for the 'legiti- 
mate and truthful China', which is also the pro-US and US-backed 'Free 
China'. The constitution was upheld as an intrinsic part of democracy, 
against the 'communist dictatorship regime'. And it was also used as a 
'cosmetic disguise' for the authoritarian rule that persisted in Taiwan 
for nearly 40 years. In more recent times, the ROC constitution has be- 
come the focus of political contention. In the debate over which political 
model to adopt to set Taiwan on its future path, different political forces 
engaged in a power struggle to control the revision of the constitution, 
which needed to be attuned to the new political situation.' 
Ironically, although the constitution can be viewed as an obsolete and 
ineffective instrument to confront the new political realities of present- 
day Taiwan, it remains the main legitimizing organ. This in respect to: 
institutional governance, the separation of powers, the structure of gov- 
ernment, national representation, the national title and the requirement 
of loyalty from its citizens. Any violation of, or attempt to redraw the 
ROC constitution (especially those parts that are implemented, added 
and revised in Taiwan) can stir up political crises and cause serious 
protests over its legitimacy. 
However, 'constitutionally' speaking, the ROC still holds territorial 
claim over the entire area of China, including Outer Mongolia (the Re- 
public of Mongolia since 1946). This particular 'China', prescribed by the 
ROC constitution, therefore, is definitely not the 'China' that is prescribed 
by the Chinese Communist Party and the constitution of the People's 
Republic of China (the PRC).j This complexity is also fully illustrated 
in a recent interview given by Taiwan's pro-independence President 
Chen Shui-bian, in the midst of his tense presidential campaign for his 
second term. Describing the complicated historical process of confront- 
ing political realities, Chen said: 
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A simple way to describe the status quo of Taiwan is this: First the Republic 
of China was on Mainland China, then the Republic of China came to Taiwan, 
then the Republic of China was on Taiwan, and now the Republic of China 
is Taiwan. ... Taiwan has never been part of Mainland China. Mainland 
China is Mainland China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan is part of the Republic 
of China, but not a part of Mainland China. Taiwan has always existed. It's 
just that the Republic of China before 1949 was on Mainland China, and 
then it came to be Taiwan. It existed on Taiwan, and now it is Taiwan? 
(Time, 16 February 2004) 
Chen's statement may accurately summarize his pro-independence 
party's official line: namely, to entrench the country's independent sov- 
ereignty while avoiding military confrontation with China by upholding 
the ROC's formal titles and constitution. 
Even if Chen is correct in stating the 'reality', that Taiwan has never 
been part of the PRC, there is no justification in denying that, viewed 
from the Mainland Chinese perspective, Taiwan is an inseparable part of 
China. The Chinese people in general believe that the PRC has inherited 
and represents the entire China, as a timeless notion with boundaries 
always clearly drawn, while both pride and shame passed on to them 
along with its past. There is no question in their minds that Taiwan be- 
longs to this seemingly eternal China; and that it was only taken away 
by imperialists in the past. Taiwan thus represents unfinished business 
left over from the civil war; it is about strengthening a unified country, 
and about redeeming the humiliation caused by foreign incursions on 
Chinese soil. In this regard, unification with Taiwan is equal to recover- 
ing the lost honour of the Chinese people. It is sacred, and is bound up 
with Chinese dignity in world affairs. 
So the 'status quo' iterated by Chen Shui-bian may be one-sided, and 
not nearly as simple as it may at first appear. In defiance, since August 
2002, Chen has re-appropriated Lee Teng-hui's 'two-country' argument, 
which originated in the late 1990s, by stressing the 'separation reality' 
of the two places.' In 2004, during Taiwan's heated presidential election 
campaign, Taiwan's pro-independence camp (led by the incumbent 
President Chen Shui-bian) for hoping to get more support for their 
campaign had manoeuvred to mobilize the independent sentiments to 
such an extent that Chen angered both Beijing and Taiwan's strongest 
ally-the US. President George W. Bush, who was prompted to send the 
strongest signal yet to discredit Chen's campaign strategy for holding 
an unnecessary referendum, suspecting that it was a plot to 'change 
the s ta tus-q~o ' .~  
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Just how did this head-on collision between the two places ever hap- 
pen? What are the historical and institutional reasons that led to these 
current complexities? 
The Beginning of Taiwanese Self-Assertion: 
Sandwiched between Traditional Roots 
and the Modern Japanese Empireg 
Taiwan became the place of exile for some Ming loyalists after the 
Manchu conquered most parts of the Mainland around the 1660s. In 
1683, Manchu, already the ruler of China, annexed a portion of Taiwan 
Island after it had defeated the last Ming resistance group holding in 
Taiwan. For most of the time, Taiwan was not a vital part of the empire's 
interests until the late 19th century. Then Taiwan's strategic importance 
increased because of the advancement of the western powers (e.g. the 
British and the French) and the ascendancy of Japan in the region. In 
1885, the Manchu emperor granted Taiwan full provincial status to 
strengthen its maritime defences against other countries. Nine years 
later (1894) the Manchu dynasty went to war with Japan because of 
the political crisis that arose in Korea. Defeated by Japan, Taiwan was 
severed from the Manchu empire and given to Japan as part of the truce 
contained in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895. 
Present-day Taiwanese national identity can be traced back at 
least to the resistance against Japanese colonialism in the early 1920s, 
when nationalistic and liberalizing ideas inspired colonized peoples 
throughout the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Taiwanese 
elites and educated youth were influenced by a progressive Japanese 
education system, and by a number of historic developments, such as 
the republican revolution in Mainland China and the Irish home-rule 
movement and its 'rebelling' against the Great Britain during in early 
20th century, the Wilsonian call for self-determination in the 1920s after 
the First World War, and later by the communist and leftist calls for class 
warfare and national liberation from imperialism. The most important 
progressive ideologies of the early 20th century all contributed to dif- 
ferent discourses and strategies of the Taiwanese resistance movement 
in one way or another (Chang 2003: 30-42; Wu 2004). 
A famous Taiwanese activist, Jiang Weishui at one time said that the 
Taiwanese owed their ethno-cultural roots to their Chinese ancestors, 
but they were also citizens belonged to Japan, although treated with 
discrimination. Another Taiwanese writer, Wu Zhuoliu, who travelled 
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to Mainland China (and later became disillusioned) wrote a famous 
novel in Japanese in 1956 (recently translated in English; see Wu 2005) 
entitled Orphan of Asia. In this work he lamented the fate of Taiwan: 
its marginalization in the world, its lack of recognition, its search for 
belonging in a world torn by wars, resentments and discriminations.1° 
Such was the moving and compelling novel derived from the 'sand- 
wiched condition' felt by most enlightened and educated Taiwanese 
youth under Japanese colonialism. 
But this early phase of Taiwanese nationalism did not evolve into its 
present form automatically. The resistance camp during the era of Japa- 
nese colonialism was divided between the left-wing movement (which 
made its appeal in name of revolution and liberation from imperialism) 
and the more moderate reform movement (which called for the estab- 
lishment of a representative council though indirect election), although 
both camps were carefully monitored and suppressed by the Japanese 
authorities. The Japanese were relatively more successful in eliciting 
patriotism for the emperor among the younger generation through 
modernization measures. These included a broad and carefully crafted 
spectrum of plans ranging from modernizing the education system, 
to improving public health, extending life expectancy, and promoting 
industrialization and urbanization, which led to the rise of a new ur- 
ban-based middle class. In the late 1930s, when the Second World War 
was at its height, efforts to promote Japanization also peaked. Some 
Taiwanese youth had chosen to side with the government because of 
practical needs and the influences from the carefully crafted 'Japaniza- 
tion' process. In the face of heavy competition, they eagerly tried to fulfil 
Japan's stringent criteria to enter the armed forces and may well have felt 
pride in defending the Empire.ll In an exemplary work on this period, 
Wu Rwei-ren (2003) argues that Taiwan could have been turned into 
another newly annexed territory (not a 'colony') like Okinawa, through 
Japan's strenuous efforts to integrate and absorb it, were it not for Japan's 
ultimate defeat and surrender in 1945 (See also Ching 2001). 
It would be fair to say that the majority of Taiwanese people had not 
won their freedom from Japanese colonization by the end of the Second 
World War. Liberating Taiwan came with its return to the 'homeland' 
represented by the KMT and the nationalistic Republic of China in 1945.12 
Though some were confused and uncertain about their future status and 
identity, the Taiwanese people in general had high hopes for post-war 
peace and reconstruction, freedom and self-autonomy. 
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In 1947, less than two years after Taiwan's return to China, clashes 
broke out. The Taiwanese rose up in riots and formed guerrilla units 
to rebel against the Chinese government in Taiwan (appointed by 
the homeland) for its mistreatment, corruption, discrimination and 
mismanagement of the general socio-economic conditions. The nation- 
alistic government in Nanjing, led by Chiang Kai-shek, sent in troops 
who brutally suppressed the uprising after the 'February 28 Incident', 
which is commemorated today as part of the long-suffering history of 
the Taiwanese, caused by 'outsiders' and ' co l~n ize rs ' .~~  
These early experiences - including resisting but also collaborating 
with Japanese, the ensuing 'liberation' and confusion, the unification 
with the 'homeland', the illusion and the atrocities-left deep scars 
on the early generations of the Taiwanese people. Some activists and 
indigenous leaders, who were lucky enough to survive, felt so alien- 
ated that they relapsed into a long silence. Others went into exile and 
formed overseas organizations to campaign for Taiwanese independence 
by advocating the overthrow of the nationalistic Chinese government 
imposed upon Taiwan. 
Thus, in a historical context, a combination of many factors rendered 
the situation conducive to the beginning of the modern Taiwanese na- 
tional self-assertion that reiterates the fundamental 1920s nationalistic 
idea: that Taiwan should belong to the Taiwanese people. Today some 
Taiwanese still feel resentful at being mistaken as 'Chinese', or even at 
the mention of any 'unification with homeland', especially coming from 
the mouths of Mainlander Chinese or the Beijing government.14 
Many identify the 'February 28 Incident' in 1947 as the watershed for 
the Taiwanese independence movement. But one should not think of 
this incident as 'the cause' of the modern Taiwan independence move- 
ment; indeed, the body of scholarship that has examined the causes 
of this incident have failed to prove this connection. The incident was 
rather the culmination of a clash between two different historical tra- 
jectories, which had projected Taiwan and Mainland China on different 
roads to modernization, nation-building, and self-identity since 1895. 
In that year, Taiwan and China had been forced to split and to embark 
on different and unknown routes. Taiwan and China even waged war 
against each other because of Japan's intensified military actions in 
China since 1926. Being separated from each other, the combined forces 
of wars, revolution, colonialism, nation-building, and the pursuit of 
modernization in general, had propelled both the people and the society 
in different directions and imbued them with different outlooks. The 
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practice of institution-building, the formation of cultural codifications 
(such as different languages), and the symbolic power for defining 
patriotism, developed differently in two separate, albeit historically re- 
lated geographical locations. In 1945, when Japan surrendered, Chinese 
nationalists went into Taiwan with the power and legitimacy to rule. 
When the two were reassembled, victorious Chinese nationalism was 
clearly positioned above the 'sandwiched' and differently imbricated 
Taiwanese identity, thereby depriving Taiwanese, especially the more 
educated of the population, of any opportunity for self-redemption. 
Resentful sentiments arose quickly as the Taiwanese found Taiwan's 
new overall social, economic and political order swiftly deteriorating, in 
contrast to their high expectations. Taiwanese political leaders were also 
angered by Chinese officials who either consciously or unconsciously 
discredited them as ill-equipped for home rule because they lacked the 
proper sense of patriotism or affinity towards China in their sentiments. 
In retrospect, clashes like the rebellion in February 28,1947 could hardly 
have been avoided. 
However, since the 1950s the Taiwan independence movement has 
been largely a movement in exile. It could hardly survive in Taiwan under 
the authoritarian regime. The movement was unorganized and had lit- 
tle resources or practical means to overthrow the ROC government that 
retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The growing support for the development 
of present-day Taiwanese nationalism came into existence at a later time, 
roughly during the late 1970s after the so-called 'Formosa Magazine Inci- 
dent' (which will be discussed later). Its evolution has its roots in specific 
historical conditions, in the struggles between political activists and the 
authorities within the confines of institutional politics, and it centres on 
partisan struggles and on revisions to the electoral institutions. 
In the following three sections, I shall discuss first, the establishment 
of an imposing socio-political structure on Taiwan; second, the reasons 
for the lack of recognition of the ROC as the true and authentic China in 
international regime, and third, the institutional setting of the intricacy 
of electoral politics and the push for democracy 'from the local to the 
national'. 
The Establishment of Authoritarian 
Chinese Rule on Taiwan, 1949-70 
When Chen Shui-bian said that 'the ROC came to Taiwan', he was refer- 
ring to the vast and violent structural changes occurring in China during 
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1948-50, which Taiwan was impotent to resist but only could accept 
the consequences. Losing to Chinese communists in the Mainland, the 
ROC's central government, including the KMT party, the military, the 
National Assembly, legislators and loyal intellectuals, which became 
the so-called Yatong' (a reference to the authentic legitimacy and the 
holy codes of the Chinese grand tradition) withdrew to Taiwan. Exiles 
regrouped on the island under the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. The 
newcomers numbered between one and one and a half million, while 
Taiwan's original population was about six million. Today they are 
identified as the first generation of the 'Mainlander' group in Taiwan. 
Mainlander elites in Taiwan enjoyed relative advantages, privileged 
access and monopoly to government power and the national cultural 
apparatus, such as the media and education. 
The basic power structure of politics was framed in two tiers. One was 
the national or central government, the ROC, sitting on the top rungs 
of the political hierarchy, with the KMT controlling the army and secu- 
rity, and directing economic development. The other was the local and 
regional Taiwan tier prescribed to support the nationalistic mission of 
the central government. The former (i.e. the ROC tier), representing the 
whole of China and dominated by the Mainlanders, was not account- 
able to the local people. Since Taiwan was seen as just a part of China, 
the political and cultural priorities, national symbols and significant 
historical meanings were assigned to the whole of China, and Taiwan 
was assigned a base position for national restoration, to pay back the 
homeland, and to retake Mainland China. Taiwan was thus regarded 
as a local or a portion that could not represent the whole. And it is thus 
on the 'lower' position vis-a-vis the symbolic making of China. 
With US backing, coupled with the Cold War ideology, the ROC's 
rule in Taiwan from 1950 to 1978 was viewed as 'hard' authoritarian- 
ism (Winkler 1984). The constitution was frozen in the name of national 
emergency and martial law was decreed for internal security. People 
were only allowed limited room for political participation at the local 
government level. The Party controlled education and the media in 
order to portray itself as genuine guardian of the country. Loyalty to 
the Party and patriotic love for the country were strongly promoted in 
an almost indistinguishable way. The government promulgated the 
absolute importance of unity. Representative government, separation 
of powers, and freedom of expression were interpreted as not befitting 
Chinese culture and societv. Dissidents such as the leftists and inde- 
pendent activists were tracked down, punished or expelled overseas. 
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A small number of the Taiwanese elites were recruited by the KMT, 
but as they were considered to have only 'local' importance, they were 
relatively marginal to the centre of power. 
During this period, the two Chinese governments on either side of 
the Taiwan Strait had proclaimed their respective determination to ac- 
complish the unification mission by eradicating the other. They engaged 
in hostile actions despite the nationalistic dream they shared. They used 
not only propaganda warfare tactics, but also military manoeuvrings 
to intimidate the other side. However, because the ROC was under the 
military umbrella of the US, and the PRC was preoccupied with do- 
mestic troubles in building 'socialist new China', the regional remained 
relatively uneventful up until the late 1970s.15 
Continuous Setbacks on the International Front 
and the 'Softening' of Authoritarianism, 1971-86 
From the 1970s onward, the KMT-ROC government began to remove 
some of the constraints that had deterred Taiwan's grassroots opposi- 
tion, though apprehensively. 'Authoritarian softening' meant that the 
government would allow local Taiwanese interests to participate in 
national politics providing this was conducted under careful scrutiny. In 
this tactic there was, to be sure, a gradual shift in the mode of domina- 
tion, from brutal suppression to more sophisticated legal punishment 
and harassment, using blatant propaganda to smear the enemy (Rigger 
1999,2001; Wu 1995: 78-80; Dickson 1996: 53-8). 
This change in ruling tactics was prompted by the continuous set- 
backs, which the government suffered in international affairs. The 
KMT-ROC government was gradually losing its long-term legitimacy 
claim to represent the whole of China in international business, and the 
rationale for upholding the hierarchical relation between the central and 
the national government of the ROC and local government of Taiwan. 
By far the most debilitating setback was the ROC's loss of its seat in the 
UN (1971). This was confirmation of the international shift that now 
recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. 
This frustration was complicated by the fact that the US was redi- 
recting its foreign policy and normalizing its relations with the PRC to 
contain the threat from the Soviet Union. President Nixon visited Beijing 
in 1972. Coming in the wake of this dramatic volfe face in US foreign 
policy was the sudden upsurge in Chinese nationalistic and patriotic 
sentiment in both Taiwan and Mainland China. It was stirred up by 
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a territorial dispute with Japan over a small and uninhabited island 
called Diaoyufai (or Senkagu) which was situated between Taiwan and 
Okinawa. These two events galvanized the call for increased national 
assertiveness, dissatisfaction with the government, and for greater 
political reforms. Combined with the rise to power in 1970 of Chiang 
Ching-kuo (who was about to succeed his father) as leader of the next 
generation, the government hesitantly responded, with liberal measures 
in handling new political demands, and by allowing intellectuals and 
activists more freedom of expression. 
This was not the end of ROC's legitimacy problem. After years of be- 
hind-the-scene negotiation, the PRC and the US finally agreed in 1978 
to establish formal diplomatic relations. The US announced this to the 
rest of the world and agreed to comply with the PRC's insistence on its 
'one-China' claim. The simplistic version of this claim is that there is one 
China, represented by the PRC, of which Taiwan is an inseparable part, 
and therefore a domestic concern of Beijing. After this came the severance 
of the mutual defence treaty between the US and the ROC, and the US 
agreement to phase out its weapon sales to Taiwan. This constituted a 
serious crisis for the ROC government, since the US was a powerful ally 
and the only country left in the world still backing up its claims.16 
These changes impacted on Taiwan's domestic politics. Now the 
previous excuses for preventing the Taiwanese people from having a 
'normal' political system and 'accountable' central government for Tai- 
wan (and only for Taiwan, not including Mainland China) drew heavy 
criticism. The demand for political reform arose in association with the 
continuing social pluralism since the mid-1970s, which followed on 
the heels of rapid economic development. The relationship between 
economic development and democratization in the third world (or in 
the socialist countries) cannot be dealt with here. Suffice it to suggest 
that at early stages of economic growth, early beneficiaries were more 
likely to support the government for moderate political reforms in order 
to further or protect their hard-earned interests. And later, if economic 
success continues to be sustainable, then people are more likely to de- 
mand large-scale systematic and institution reforms, either because of 
rising social inequality or relative deprivation. 
The last incident of brutal suppression against political dissidents - 
the 'Formosa Magazine Incident' -took place in December 1979. Mass 
arrests and courts martial were handed out to Taiwanese dissidents 
accused of treason and subversion, linked to Chinese communists.17 
The 1979 crackdown, ironically, helped to boost overseas Taiwanese 
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independence groups, attracting younger Taiwanese (overseas students 
and businessmen) who became sympathizers for Taiwan's independ- 
ence. The incident also 'awakened' some of the post-war generation of 
Taiwanese youth. Sympathizers interpreted this incident as a brutal as- 
sault on Taiwanese identity by an outside regime. But this did give the 
younger generation of Taiwanese activists first-hand experience of the 
suppression previously meted out to the older generation of Taiwanese 
activists? Because of the Formosa Magazine Incident, the domestic 
dissidents and the overseas activists could now finally support each 
other in questioning the legitimacy of the ROC. Thus, together they 
obtained in 1991 the freedom to openly express support for Taiwan 
independence.19 
The weakness of the authoritarian measures forced the government 
to comply with increased demands for political liberties, social justice 
and accountable politics. In the period 1980-86, Taiwan's opposition 
continued to grow with a blend of three sets of interrelated discourses. 
The dominant one was of course, democratization, for example, protect- 
ing human rights, legalizing party politics and broadening the scope 
for political participation. The second discourse was for social reform, 
which comprised a mix of progressive grassroots social movements from 
women to aborigines, and some pro-labour and farmers' leftist ideas. 
And the third discourse was self-determination: the right for Taiwanese 
people to decide their own future. This last one was not yet a blunt 
statement for Taiwan independence, since this was still strictly forbid- 
den. Advocates for self-determination resorted to the phrase 'Taiwanese 
need to be their own master' in a suggestive and milder way, to test the 
regime's tolerance levels. 
'Long Live the Election!'- The Characteristics 
of Taiwan's Democratization Process 
Taiwan's democratization process since the 1970s is generally seen as 
relatively peaceful and incremental (Tien 1989; Chu 1992; Copper 1998; 
Rigger 1999; Alagappa 2001). But this also reveals the painfully slow 
process through which the KMT yielded to the democratic movement. 
The institutional reason for this slow process was the continued exist- 
ence of elaborate election schemes established since early 1951. In the 
beginning it was designed to suppress communist insurgents and to 
enhance the dominant position of the KMT government. But soon it 
evolved into setting the 'game rules' that would prescribe the probable 
political actions to take place. It served two important functions: one, 
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to provide a relatively practical (though still very risky) instrument 
of last resort and the only possible venue to challenge the authority, 
compared to going underground or into exile to advocate toppling the 
government. Two, it worked to help the KMT to stabilize the regime 
by letting the pressures and discontents to go off periodically under 
close watch during election times. A comparison between Taiwan, the 
Philippines and South Korea would reveal the extent to which Taiwan's 
political changes have been surrounded by revisions to the regulations 
governing electoral institutions and the winning of significant posts in 
major elections. It is fair to say that Taiwan had election(s) long before it 
had democracy; and elections even as it helped the push for democracy 
from the bottom-up during the authoritarian era, excluding other more 
radical means to topple the regime. 
This is not to say that elections in Taiwan had thus far been fair or that 
political participation was guaranteed. In fact, the building of electoral 
institutions has been a difficult and contentious political process. Every 
election has been fought not only as one battle to win a post, but also 
as a battle to enlarge the theatre of war, meaning to test the tolerance 
limits set by the authorities for full political participation and protec- 
tion of human rights. Elections have also provided the opportunity to 
challenge the system, in the face of a legacy of monopolistic and unfair 
practices wielded by the KMT's supreme power. 
Table 1 provides a chronology of changes in electoral institutions 
since the 1950s. Several conclusions can be drawn from the changing 
process. First, it should be noted that these institutions have developed 
bottom-up, from levels of low significance and competition, to those of 
high significance and party competition. This trend is reflected in the 
gradual expansion of the electoral system and an increased number of 
posts at the higher levels. 
By 1992, the public had elected all their representatives to different con- 
gresses. Former 'permanent' congressional members were finally forced 
into retirement. By 1994, all significant city-provincial magistrates' posi- 
tions were open for competitive election also. And by 1996, after waves 
of political struggle, the office of the head of the state became an elected 
one. The paper will later elaborate on the significance of this change. 
Second, we should take note that the significance of elections for dif- 
ferent political activists and parties has developed differently. It would 
be fair to say that in the period before 1970, elections were more like 
window dressings of the ROC. Even when supplementary election(s) to 
the ageing congress began in 1969 and 1972,20 and was further extended 
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TABLE 1: The Evolution of Electoral Institutions in Taiwan, 1950-200021 
Years 
1950-71 
(Only local 
elections) 
1972-90 
(Gradual 
opening at the 
national level) 
1991-92 
(Establishing 
the new 
representative 
congress 
1994 
(Three more 
important 
posts) 
1996-2000 
(Presidential 
Election) 
Posts Open to 
Political Competi- 
tion 
Significance for the 
Ruling Party, the 
KMT (until 20001 
1) Village and dis- 
trict head, district 
1) Showcases demo- 
cracv for 'free China1 
representative 
2) County-city magi- 
strate and councils 
(excluding the two 
major cities, Taipei 
and Kaohsiung 
since 1966) 
3) Taiwan provin- 
cial council 
2) Co-opting and con- 
trol rural farmers after 
land reform success 
3) Pacifying the land- 
lords 
4) Expanding local 
support for the Party 
Supplementary 
elections for natio- 
1) Improving KMT's 
legitimacy claim by 
nal representati- 
ves since 1972; 
expanded in 1981 
(but old congress 
members remained 
in the majority) 
allowing Taiwanese 
representatives enter- 
ing the central level 
2) Recruiting more 
Taiwanese politicians 
in the ruling party 
New National As- 
sembly and Legis- 
lature (replacing 
the old members 
elected in 1949) 
1) To compete to win 
and to retain power 
2) To transform from a 
vanguard party into a 
democratic party 
3) To become indigen- 
ized and rooted in 
Taiwan 
4) Internal power 
struggle leading to 
break-uo 
1) Taipei and Kaoh- 
siung City Mayors 
2) Taiwan Provin- 
1) Deepening indi- 
genization of KM7 
and internal vower 
cial Governor 
and internal power 
struggle 
2) Competing for lead- 
ing Taiwanization (the 
silent revolution1) 
3) Spinning off the two 
ends of the extreme 
from the KMT 
struggle 
2) Competing for 
leading Taiwanization 
(the silent revolution1) 
President and Vice- 
oresident 
Significance for Opposition 
(later the DPP in 1986) until 
2000 
1) Deepening indigeni- 
zation of the KM7 
1) Isolated and mild protest, 
unorganized dissidents 
2) Slim chance for winning 
and high personal costs to 
compete against the KM 
1) Expansion in election 
holidays. Forming organized 
opposition movement, leading 
to the founding of the DPP 
(1986), demanding political 
freedoms 
2) Elevating the opposition 
from local to the central 
government 
3) Advocating fundamental 
rights to the Taiwanese people 
to decide on their own future 
1) Pressing social and political 
changes for better and more 
accountable government 
2) Indigenization and promot- 
ing Taiwanese identity 
3) Competing for the majority 
for self-legitimating 
1) Competing for the majority 
2) Competing for leading 
Taiwanization 
1) Self-transformation, inclin- 
ing to the middle to win 
2) Competing for leading Tai- 
wanization to guarantee the 
room for self-determination 
3) Competing for presidency, 
looking to regime change 
hand, and win Taiwan back 
from outsider1 
4) Resisting incorporation into 
the 'Greater China'. 
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in 1983, the KMT was still in complete domination and no election result 
could topple the power structure.22 The KMT used elections to recruit 
younger-generation Taiwanese into the ruling party, and therefore to 
legitimize the regime's authoritarian sway. But this new supplementary 
electoral system was viewed differently way by the opposition. Now 
they not only had room to manoeuvre but also influence at the national 
level to strive for. They took the opportunity to speak out to test the 
limit of the authorities' tolerance and their determination for reform 
(and for suppression as well). 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the results of supplementary elections, 
though skewed, were used as political barometers, to measure how 
'unpopular' (not 'popular') the KMT was among Taiwanese people. 
Thus, during this period, the KMT government felt compelled to mo- 
bilize its security and propaganda machine to intimidate and smear its 
adversaries (Tien 1989). During the late1970s, the opposition alliance in 
Taiwan was networking as a semi-political party, emerging in the name 
of Dangzoai (meaning outside the KMT party). They seized the brief and 
periodic interstices of political openness during the election season. This 
was the background for well-known expressions like 'election holidays' 
and 'long live the election' slogans of the late1970s and early 1980s. The 
'holiday' metaphor was to suggest the temporary slacking in repression 
by the government during election time. Thus the dissidents used these 
interludes to express their ideas and political positions with less fear 
and restraint. The second expression suggested the importance of the 
election, and the striving for election fairness, as a time for the dissidents 
to challenge the authority and to push for reform.23 
By 1986, the opposition had gained about 30 percent or more of the votes 
in most of the quasi nationwide elections, despite the KMT's manipulation 
and smears against the Dangzoai members. As support for the opposition 
grew, in a daring move, it formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
in September of that year. Much to the surprise of the electorate, dictator 
Chiang Ching-kuo decided to lift martial law to allow the DPP to exist 
(asserting that they should adhere to the policy of 'one China', without 
supporting independence for Taiwan). Thus, the 'liberalization' process 
speeded up in his last two years of his office. The political momentum in 
Taiwan shifted towards democratization and the DPP.2" 
It is still a mystery why Chiang chose to liberalize; he left no personal 
records to explain his decision. But it is possible to view the context in 
which Chiang was governing as offering few alternatives. One of the 
main reasons lay in Taiwan's continuous downslide in international 
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status, despite its economic success. Added to that was of course the 
PRC's increasing pressure for peaceful unification along its new national 
course in the pursuit of modernization and self-tran~formation.~~ The
KMT acutely felt the pressure of propaganda emanating from the Chinese 
Communist Party. Also the US government had often criticized Taiwan 
for its mistreatment and suspected murder of political dissidents. But, in 
the final analysis, it must be Chiang's unsurpassed power that made him 
secure enough to almost single-handedly change the course of KMT. 
The death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 marked the beginning of the 
end of the Fatong of the ROC in Taiwan, and triggered more demands 
for electoral political reform in the name of democratization and indi- 
genization. Chiang left his presidency, including the ROC's legacy, to Lee 
Teng-hui who succeeded him from the position of vice-president. Lee 
came from the Taiwanese background of a Japanese family. He became 
the first native Taiwanese to assume such a top position. According to 
Lee himself, the succession was not carefully designed or promoted by 
Chiang, but took place as a passing event along the institutional chain 
of succe~sion.~~ 
Lee, though a native Taiwanese, was an 'outsider' of the old KMT 
ruling circle dominated by Mainlanders. In Lee's early years of govern- 
ment, he co-operated with the old circle by following Chiang's previous 
strategy in dealing with the opposition (Chang 1994). He manoeuvred 
to fence off the DPP, trying to keep the KMT and the Fatong to preserve 
its dominance, and he yielded to pressure only when strictly necessary. 
But he and the KMT party were now facing not only a rising, stronger 
and more defiant DPP, but also other social movements demanding 
progressive ideological reforms for 'self-determination', democracy, 
environment protection and welfare reforms. The self-determination 
principle was inserted into the DPP's various party planks, upholding 
the statement that Taiwan's future was to be decided by the people of 
Taiwan. For instance, in 1987, it said that people of Taiwan should have 
the right to pursue national independence. In 1988, it stated that Taiwan 
was a sovereign independent nation, which did not belong to 'the PRC 
led by Beijing'.27 In 1990, it stated that Taiwan's sovereignty would not 
extend to Mainland China or to Outer Mongolia. At the same time, the 
political power of the KMT's old circle was pushed back because of ris- 
ing domestic pressures, especially by the 'March Movement' (or March 
Student Movement) of 1990, and also indirectly by the suppression of 
the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. 
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Taiwan's opposition movement rose to another level in March 1990. A 
burgeoning social protest from college students, various organizations 
and DPP supporters galvanized the movement. They objected to the 
attempted manipulation of the presidential election by the permanent 
members of the National Assembly (consisted of mostly Mainlanders 
elected in 1949, who never retired). These members were part of the 
Fatong, who supposedly possessed the institutional power to elect 
the president on behalf of the entire people of China. The old guards 
had networked to favour a particular pair of candidates instead of its 
chairman, Lee, the incumbent and the popular Taiwanese president. 
Waves of students and the general public protested in uproar. But the 
drama ended peacefully as the old National Assembly caved in at the 
last minute under mounting pressure. And Lee Teng-hui was elected 
as the more popular new president as the victor emerged out of the 
chaotic situation. 
By comparison, ten months earlier the Tiananmen democratic move- 
ment, also led by the youth, emerged in Beijing. If it appeared familiar 
and seemed to parallel the movement in Taiwan, the overall result was 
strikingly opposite. The mass killing of demonstrators had repercussions 
on Taiwan. Though the lesson may have many meanings to different 
people, the consensus of opinion was that the Communist Party could 
be 'deadly' serious if it was threatened. After years of propaganda from 
the KMT, most people in Taiwan had finally experienced an eyewitness 
account of the brutal suppression committed by the Chinese Communist 
Party. In comparison, Taiwan has earned its democracy through civil 
disobedience, and Taiwan and Mainland China are worlds apart. Now 
the call for national unification with China looked even more uncon- 
vincing because of the comparison. 
These movements and changes in both Taipei and Beijing politics set 
the background for the following major revisions in the ROC constitu- 
tion, including the removal of the old guard in the central representative 
bodies after some 42 years in power. After the old Mainlander repre- 
sentatives loyal to the KMT were retired, more vacant posts to be filled 
by elections created sudden opportunities for upward political mobility 
(Chang 19%). 
This trend was a welcome one for the newly rising Taiwanese within 
the KMT. And the newer and younger KMT members felt free from the 
burden of defending the Party's unjustifiable old legacy. In fact, despite 
the retiring of the old guard, the KMT was always able to win in the 
national elections because of its tremendous resources and vested inter- 
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ests amassed throughout the years. The Taiwanese voters for some time 
were concerned with the images of the DPP and their lack of credibility 
to manage the country's national security and economy. The inability 
of the DPP to obtain a sweeping victory throughout the 1990s must be 
accredited to the leadership of KMT, or the 'silent revolution' led by 
Taiwan's former president and KMT chairman, Lee Teng-hui. 
Now we turn to a final important point that emerges from Tablel: the 
'silent revolution' linked to the direct election of the president of the ROC 
since 1996. ROC's first Taiwanese president Lee served as the KMT's 
party chairman from 1988 until 2000 before his forced expulsion from 
the Party by mostly Mainlander loyalists in mass protests.28 Lee in many 
ways described the process for the transformation of the ROC, Taiwan, 
under his leadership as a 'silent revolution'. This could be interpreted to 
mean all-out and co-ordinated efforts to make the KMT, the ROC and 
its constitution, adapt to the new political, economic and global situa- 
tion. It also included aggressive diplomacy, lobbying foreign dignitaries 
for their support, programmes to re-socialize the general public in the 
name of 'love of community and soil', and to build the 'common fate of 
the community' among all the people of Taiwan. 
The political and cultural transformation of the 'silent revolution' was 
the 'indigenization' process, which had no precise meaning. Lee used it 
interchangeably with 'democratization'. Broadly speaking, 'indigeniza- 
tion' could be understood as affirming Taiwanese interests, historical 
sentiments, and self-identity in contrast to those that had previously 
been imposed by Chinese nationalistic traditions. Specifically, it was 
about shifting political power and cultural domination from the Main- 
landers' hands and Chinese interests to that of the native Taiwanese. It 
also entailed assigning the cultural and historical experiences of Taiwan 
to a prominent position in framing the people's passionate love for the 
land and the country of Taiwan. It was also therefore known as the 'de- 
Sinicization' process, which meant replacing 'China' with 'Taiwan' in 
substance and in name. And this was done also in the context of expand- 
ing and intensifying electoral politics, democratization and ousting the 
defensive old KMT constituency from the political centre. 
The most important change on the institutional level, besides the elec- 
tion of national representatives and legislators in the early 1990s, was 
the direct election of the president in 1996. Like the other institutional 
changes that had taken place throughout the democratization period, 
this change succeeded amidst much protest and political conflict. On the 
one hand, the pro-DPP and pro-Taiwan independence camp thought that 
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this change would give them the long-awaited opportunity to rule the 
country through winning the presidency. On the other hand, the KMT 
conservatives criticized the proposed change as violating the symbolic 
representation of the whole of China, and of yielding to the Taiwan in- 
dependence cause. Lee Teng-hui accomplished this major reform with 
shrewd strategic moves, allying his support from outside of the KMT, 
especially with the DPP's constituency, to overcome opposition, which 
mainly existed within his own party. 
Lee's success also boosted his already high popularity among Tai- 
wanese voters. He became the first directly elected president of the 
ROC in 1996 with a decisive majority.29 Because of Lee and his silent 
revolution, the KMT, which originated from the Mainland, now be- 
came indigenously transformed, and was therefore able to rule Taiwan 
continuously between 1994 and 2000.30 It has been argued that without 
this indigenization process, which began in the early 1990s, the KMT 
would have lost its legitimacy and domination much sooner. Moreover, 
Taiwan would have been plunged into a more chaotic situation with 
further political turmoil. 
Allowing citizens to choose their own president in 1996 through direct 
voting can be seen as a decisive turning point in the ROC government's 
drive to become fully 'Taiwanized', for the ROC to become fully merged 
into Taiwan, although this was not achieved without creating internal 
divisions. Now all parties and candidates, despite their nationalistic 
tendencies, would have to join the institutionalized political system if 
they wanted to be taken seriously. And a president of the ROC directly 
elected by Taiwan citizens definitely legitimized the ROC's existence in 
Taiwan. From now on there could be no alternative other than to take 
part in institutional politics, unless more radical means were resorted 
to, such as toppling the ROC government. 
So far we have outlined the uneven course of present-day Taiwanese 
nationalism. It started out primarily as a domestic conflict, resisting the 
domination of the Taiwanese by the KMT-ROC polity; later forcing the 
ROC government to become accountable to Taiwanese. But soon after 
political liberation and democratization began, Taiwanese nationalism 
became a viable option for partisan struggles for national representa- 
tion and power structures. Of course, these changes did not occur over- 
night; they were achieved gradually through major electoral struggles, 
the expansion of elections, geo-political changes, and regional events 
related to changes occurring in Mainland China. One led to another, 
incrementally. Taiwanese nationalist supporters would now have to 
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directly face the CCP-PRC's intimidation against pro-Taiwan inde- 
pendence parties. And to do this and to forge itself a secured political 
future, the pro-independence parties would need to win continuously 
and decisively in nationwide elections against its arch nemesis- the 
traditional constituency of the old KMT-China still existing in Taiwan. 
(So far they have not been able to accomplish this at all). 
Repercussions of Taiwan's 'Indigenization': 
Domestic and Cross-Strait Politics 
By the 1990s, the political changes discussed in this paper, including 
democratization and indigenization, had resulted in two serious reper- 
cussions. The first, on the domestic front, was that the issue of Taiwan's 
national identity began to rise to the top of major policy debates, over- 
shadowing routine politics and other social activities. Not surprisingly, 
the 'silent revolution' and Taiwanese affirmation drew counter-attacks 
from Mainlander constituencies in Taiwan from both the liberal and the 
conservative camps. The battlefield of Taiwan's domestic politics thus 
became much more ruthless and vicious. 
For instance, the power struggle within the KMT, the expulsion and 
marginalization of Mainlander elites from influential positions, and the 
de-Sinicization process resulted on two occasions in the break-up of the 
KMT. On the first occasion this led to the emergence of the New Party 
in 1993, which allowed the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian to win the 
post of mayor of Taipei City. The second occasion in 2000 was marked 
by an acrimonious split between its die-hard supporters, which allowed 
the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, once again to win the presidential 
elections in March of that year. The DPP not only encouraged but also 
benefited from the KMT-promoted indigenization campaign. They allied 
with Lee Teng-hui in his intra-party squabbles, tactically criticizing the 
'old' China power base on important issues. 
By March 2004, after three national presidential elections in eight 
years, party politics became much more complicated (albeit also sim- 
plified since all political parties now are divided and measured on a 
simple political gauge marked by their standings on Taiwan's future 
and identity issues. Two new political parties surfaced because of the 
dissolution of the power base of the KMT in 2000-01, related to the presi- 
dential election of 2000. Losing the presidency to DPP's Chen Shui-bian 
forced the KMT to hand over the government to the DPP. This marked 
the first ever regime transition in Taiwan, drawing loud applause for the 
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success of the democratization process. But Lee was criticized heavily 
and held responsible for 'destroying the KMT and selling out the country 
(to the DPP)'31 after this second major loss. Protesters rallied and force 
him to quit from the Party and he stepped down as party chairman with 
bitterness. Later his supporters and sympathizers regrouped to form 
a new party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which has been the 
most outspoken party for Taiwanese independence and for de-siniciza- 
tion. In 2004 the TSU held 13 seats, or 6 percent of the total seats in the 
Legislature Yuan. 
The second spin-off was the People's First Party (PFP), also formed 
in 2001. The PFP was represented by some hardliners of the KMT who 
strongly opposed Taiwanese independence. They first felt betrayal by 
Lee Teng-hui's nomination of Lien Chan, rather than their own favoured 
candidate, James Soong, who had represented the KMT in the presi- 
dential elections of 2000. They believed that Soong, who had enjoyed 
high popularity in pre-election polls, should have been nominated and 
that his victory would have been assured. Because of this intra-party 
conflict and Soong's determination to run as an independent candidate 
outside of the KMT, which effectively split the vote, both Soong and 
Lien lost to the DPP's Chen Shui-bian. Afterwards, they blamed Lee 
for forcing them to walk out from the KMT in the 2000 elections, which 
had disgraced the ROC and had opened the way for the DPP to take 
power. Consequently, in 2001 the PFP was established with Soong as 
their chairman. They managed to win 46 seats, or 20 percent the total 
seats in the Legislature in 2004. 
Entering the 2004 presidential elections, Taiwan's political map was 
clearly marked with two colours: the pan-Blue and the pan-Green. The 
former, KMT loyalists and the hardliners of the People First Party, become 
the Blue camp. They spoke strongly and passionately against surging 
Taiwan independence, and proposed a more practical approach towards 
the PRC, aimed at improving cross-Strait relations. As for the Green 
camp, represented by the DPP and TSU, both are firm supporters of the 
pro-Taiwanese independence movement, opting for strong defence and 
Taiwanese nationalism to resist the PRC's unification tactics. 
The second major repercussion centres on the worsening and hostile 
relationship with the PRC. This formed the backdrop to the Taiwan 
Strait crisis from August 1995 to March 1996 (Zhao 1999a, 199913; Chen 
1999). The trigger was Lee Teng-hui's unprecedented visit (dubbed 
as 'ice-breaking') to the US in June 1995. This was followed by Lee's 
abrupt change in tone when speaking of the future of China. The media 
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nicknamed his new standing on cross-Strait relation as the 'two-coun- 
try statement', which denied 'one-China' ever existed and claimed the 
ROC's long existing sovereignty since 1911. He also refused to accept 
'one-China' as the presupposition or the predetermined result for the 
two sides to negotiate with each other. 
Fearing that the US may be reneging on its commitment to 'one-China', 
and angered by Taiwan's move and Lee's remarks on sovereignty, China 
decided to chastize Taiwan by sending stern warnings. The crisis was 
marked with four large-scale military exercises in southern China in 
less than a year, combined with the launching of ballistic missiles into 
areas close to Taiwan's waters. China made grave threats to invade 
if Taiwan should delay unification or pursue independence. China's 
warning came at a time when Taiwan's first presidential campaign was 
just about to take place. 
The crisis ended with the US sending in two carrier battle groups near 
Taiwan waters, and publicly reaffirming its support for the 'one-China' 
policy but also its commitment to its domestic Act, the Taiwan Relations 
Act. On the other hand, the intimidation had to end since it proved to be 
a misreading of Taiwanese public opinion and its political culture. Lee 
Teng-hui was able to win with a strong majority over other candidates 
(including those who looked more acceptable to Beijing). The victory 
represented a robust endorsement for Lee's policy, and some believe 
that China may even have indirectly helped Lee by attacking him for 
being a 'villain'. 
Following Lee's victory as the people's first elected national leader, 
Beijing intensified its campaign known as wen gong wu he (verbal attacks 
plus intimidating actions). It launched a global campaign known as fan 
du cu tong (oppose independence and support unification) against the 
Taiwanese government, Lee, the DPP and other political factions that 
favoured separatism. To back up its warning, Beijing has since stepped 
up the modernization of its military machinery, obtaining a new mili- 
tary arsenal from the former Soviet Union in an attempt to deter US 
intervention if an invasion of Taiwan became necessary. 
China's tough stance appears to have given them few positive political 
gains as far as national unification is concerned. It could not even stop 
the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and its leader Chen 
Shui-bian from winning the presidential elections twice in 2000 and 2004. 
But Beijing has something to look forward to: the sharp divisions of in- 
terests and worldviews existing among Taiwanese citizens. On the one 
hand, Beijing has been successful in isolating Taiwan on the international 
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stage by playing up its hostility against the Taiwanese government. 
International isolation can hurt Taiwan's business interests and Taiwan 
is clearly anxious not to become marginalized from the international 
community in this age of globalization. How are the Taiwanese to solve 
this isolation and political hostility? So far the Taiwanese government 
has elected to maintain its opposition and to break through the imposed 
constraints, trying (without much success) to direct its business interests 
to South East Asian regions instead of Mainland China. But the citizens 
are divided; some are willing to adopt a more pragmatic and concilia- 
tory position to negotiate with Beijing, and to renounce what they see 
as a hopeless drive for Taiwanese independence. 
This pragmatic stance is based on Taiwan's growing economic depend- 
ence on China. Beijing has attracted Taiwanese capital (into the PRC) 
and is alluring as a market. In 2003, about one-quarter of Taiwan's trade 
surplus came from trade with China (including Hong Kong), and about 
one-half of Taiwan's foreign investment went to China. Thus, China 
has gradually (and ironically) become Taiwan's most valuable trading 
'partner' since the mid-1990s, when it was also under the constant threat 
of a Chinese incursion. To complicate matters further, it is estimated that 
there are a million Taiwanese (out of a population of 23 million) living, 
studying, doing business or travelling to China every day, while some 
have chosen to live there permanently. Cross-Strait marriages are also 
on the rise and are becoming quite a sensitive political issue. 
These two opposing forces, political hostility and economic interde- 
pendence, are creating divergent interests and dividing public opinion 
in Taiwan. At one extreme, there are those who wish to defy China, 
resist the pressure emanating from Beijing, and go all the way to strive 
for Taiwan's national status and independence. The other practical view 
supports a more moderate position towards China. And Taiwan's politi- 
cal parties and their representatives are about equally divided. 
Since political hostility and economic need, or national security and 
economic interdependence, contradict each other, China can now play 
Taiwan's domestic political ball game more easily by both manipulating 
people's vested interests (or future interest) in China by playing with 
Taiwan's internal politics and political rivalries, and by exerting pres- 
sure on the Taiwanese government on questions of national identity 
and unification. 
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Conclusion: Defining and Resolving 
the Difficult 'Status Quo' 
In this paper I have presented an outline of Taiwan's resistance to 'China'. 
The word has at least two faces: one relates to the lingering legacy of 
the ROC, the 'old China', and the other relates to the PRC China, the 
'new China'. From a historical-institutional framework, I have discussed 
reasons that have led to the ROC-Taiwan being what it is today. I have 
also focused on the interactions between the international environ- 
ment, Taiwan's national status, and domestic politics. The crucial point 
is Taiwan's long-established self-assertion through its early history, 
its democratization movement and Lee Teng-hui's 'silent revolution', 
which is now largely inherited and capitalized upon by the Green camp. 
These factors read together have transformed the ROC which settled in 
Taiwan since 1949. And during this transformation process, two major 
historical developments are crucial. One is the ROC's dwindling inter- 
national status since the 1970s; and the second is China's emergence as 
a major player in world affairs and in the global marketplace since the 
late 1980s. There is little here that Taiwan could have changed, since 
both contingencies were created beyond Taiwan's (or ROC's) border by 
bigger and stronger global movers. 
And this analysis has also found that Taiwanese nationalism has not 
always been a viable choice or the prime driver in the political agenda. 
It surfaced slowly in late 1970s, developed quickly in late 1980s, and 
became a fully-fledged force only in the late 1990s. Its growth is embed- 
ded in Taiwan's electoral and partisan struggles, and hence its progress 
has been incremental through political re-shufflings, especially in im- 
portant elections. 
There is little doubt that Taiwan has nearly completed its sovereignty 
construction process from its own internal political viewpoint. It has 
built a clear political hierarchical system with an elected, accountable 
and democratic leadership. What is surprising is the ROC's constitution, 
which is still in effect and is regarded as the foundation of power, even 
though it is constantly criticized for being 'foreign' and 'out of date'. 
The many elections and reforms of electoral institutions that have taken 
place under the umbrella of the constitution have allowed the people 
participating in these processes to build an 'imagined community' of a 
de facto Taiwan. 
Today, international relations analysts and politicians believe that 
retaining the 'status quo' may be the best bet for keeping peace in the 
Mau-Kuei Michael Chang 
region for some time. Public opinion in Taiwan also supports this idea. 
But what 'status quo' has ever been static? It is dynamic in global affairs, 
regional relations, geo-politics and, of course, domestic politics. What 
is the 'status quo' after all? 
Recent official statements from the US have rendered the meaning 
of the term, status quo, intriguing if not problematic. In December 2003, 
President Bush stated that he opposed Chen Shui-bian's campaign stra- 
tegy by holding a referendum calling on China to remove its missiles 
aimed at Taiwan, since he saw Chen intending to 'change the status quo 
unilaterally'. Later, in May 2004, when testifying in the US Congress, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James 
Kelly, stated that the Bush administration would 'oppose any unilateral 
move from Taipei or Beijing aiming at changing the status quo', adding 
that the status quo should be 'as we define it' (Devan 2004). 
As Kelly understood and admitted, the 'status quo' is not an object 
reality out there, but is defined and framed from the viewpoint of dif- 
ferent interests. And this has worked well as far as the US interests are 
concerned. The US has said it would support 'one China' since 1972 
but has not aided and abetted unification. It has been more positive in 
dealing with China except insisting on its arms sales and commitment 
to defend Taiwan, which really irritates Beijing. The US also warned 
Taiwan not to provoke Beijing on the issue of sovereignty, or not to 
count on US support as unconditional (Pan 2003). 
The PRC has its own idea of status quo, though this is much more 
transparent than that of the US though. From its unique historical per- 
spective, Taiwan has 'always' belonged to China. At present, the PRC 
represents the whole of China governed by the Chinese Communist 
Party, and Taiwan is a renegade province of PRC. The status quo is, 
therefore, not regarded as normal. It would become a great humilia- 
tion for Beijing if it could not resolve this problem. The PRC leaders 
have had little option other than proclaiming that Taiwan should and 
must be reunited, regardless of cost. If peaceful means are not enough 
to carry out unification, then forceful means must be used. Thus, any 
political moves from Taiwan, the US, any other countries or interna- 
tional organizations, multinational companies, even individuals (such 
as academicians or scholars) are carefully watched and monitored. So 
the CCP-PRC's basic assumption of 'status quo' is biased in favour of 
its interests in the unification with Taiwan, or the stopping of Taiwan 
independence. Any move against this interest is seen as an intention to 
change the 'status quo', and therefore to be rebutted. 
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The ROC, or Taiwan government under Chen Shui-bian, has its own 
idea of 'status quo'. The status quo is ROC, and that is Taiwan. To be 
sure, the ROC title and legacy it carries is not something the Taiwan 
president wants to embrace, but it is far more acceptable compared to 
other alternatives. And, to the DPP and his administration, Taiwan has 
no need to declare independence since it already enjoys independent 
sovereign status. Chen Shui-bian has promised more than once that 
Taiwan would keep the ROC as its national title unless Beijing decides 
on invasion. But the status quo also means that Taiwan is not recog- 
nized as a sovereign nation by most of the countries of the international 
community. It is excluded from many of the world organizations, and 
sidelined in matters that may affect its trading prospects in the global 
marketplace. It also needs to invest a high proportion of its GDP for 
national self-defence, suffers from inefficiencies in government for lack 
of a suitable constitution, and, without decisive national direction, is 
politically rent asunder by internal divisions. Though most Taiwanese 
support a 'status quo', some feel this is also not normal; that the rem- 
edy should be either building a completely sovereign and independent 
Taiwan, or accepting the 'One Country Two Systems' deal offered by 
Beijing. It is certainly unrealistic to expect Taiwanese citizens to feel 
indifferent to the issue of determining their country's future and forging 
a clear national direction, or to be insensitive to necessary reform of its 
political institutions through democratic processes. In short, to expect 
them not to do anything to change the status quo-not to negotiate 
the possibilities, and not to struggle against the limits imposed by the 
PRC - may be asking too much. 
Since both the PRC China and many in Taiwan believe that this so- 
called 'status quo' is really not desirable, and since the US'S notion of 
the 'status quo' accords with its own interests, attempts to modify and 
redefine the term are bound to occur. For Taiwan's domestic politics, 
forceful attempts in this direction are most likely to be drawn up in the 
next election battle. 
Epilogue 
In March 2005, during submission and revision of this paper, the Na- 
tional People's Congress of the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law, which 
especially targeted Taiwanese independence. The law reiterates the 
PRC's position against Taiwan's independence, and the 'non-peaceful 
means' (now legalized and prescribed in codes) it will use against Taiwan 
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if other peaceful measures fail. Taiwan government's official reaction 
was moderate, heeding to the advice of the US government, for fear of 
heightening the tension, while hundreds of thousands of citizens, some 
responding to the call by the DPP and the TSU, marched into Taipei City 
to protest against PRC's threat by expressing their belief in democracy 
and support for Taiwan patriotism. 
Given this new development, the main thesis of this paper still 
holds true. Taiwanese nationalism is here to stay, to transform, within 
the range of the possibilities inscribed in Taiwan's domestic politics, 
which are also structured by geo-political powers outside of its borders. 
Peace may be preserved against all odds, but the status quo is always 
dynamic. 
Mau-Kuei Michael Chang is Research Fellozo and Professor at the Institute of 
Sociology, Acadenzia Sinica, Nangang, Taipei. 
NOTES 
I began this paper during my visit to the International Institute for Asian Studies 
(IIAS), Leiden University. I am grateful to all concerned for the friendly working 
environment and the opportunity to organize and participate at the Workshop on 
the National Self-Assertion of East Asian Countries. I must thank also the gener- 
ous support of the N W 0  (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) from 1 
December to 30 May 2004. Colleagues (too many to name) at the Sinology Institute 
of Leiden University have been very helpful and supportive during my stay there. 
I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and critiques, 
which have resulted in major revisions to the original paper. 
This idea of 'heping tongyi, yiguo liangzhi' [Peaceful Unification, One Country Two 
Systems] was originally attributed to Deng Xiaoping in 1983, and was formalized in 
1984 in Deng's Government Report to the PRC's People's Assembly. The guidelines 
of this principle have been elaborated or modified by various high-ranking leaders 
such as Jiang Zemin in 1995, which includes the famous 'Eight Points', and by Qian 
Qisen in 2003. From Beijing's standpoint, this guideline is flexible and generous, 
and extends to 'all' Chinese people. 
I wish to emphasize the importance of taking a 'balanced' view. Partisan or national 
political interests, either hidden or professed, always affect interpretations of the past 
and current conflicts. No one is immune. But I think pursuing an analytical purpose 
and maintaining logical argument can help to evoke a more balanced view, which 
prevents one from falling into chauvinistic, ethno-centric and opportunistic biases 
and misinformation. My adopted position centres on interpreting the Taiwanese 
condition. Some reviewers may suggest that I need to cover the PRC's or the US'S 
view more fully. I would agree if it were not for the limits of space and the specific 
focus of this paper. And I think the PRC's view will be presented fuller in Phi1 Dean's 
article, which also appears in this special issue. For recent publications on Chinese 
nationalism, see also: Zheng (1999), Zhao (2004) and Gries (2004). 
For instance, the ROC constitution has gone through six revisions since 1990. And 
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each revision has entailed a major political battle associated with a continuous power 
struggle. 
' Likewise, though the PRC does not recognize the ROC and its constitution, it was 
also ambivalent about the extent to which Taiwan could revise the ROC constitution. 
For instance, when Taiwan's pro-independence president Chen Shui-bian suggested 
that the ROC constitution needed re-drafting in order to abandon its territorial claims 
over the entire mainland of China, Beijing reacted with outrage and warned against 
such moves would be a step moving from de fac to  to de jure independence. 
The emphasis is the author's. 
Lee's notion of 'two countries' in the late 1990s still held out the idea for a unified 
China in the future. He set the recognition of the ROC as an equal political entity by 
the PRC as the premise for negotiating the future. In the second half of 2002, Chen 
stepped up its criticism against China. Chen was quoted as saying that 'Our country 
cannot be bullied, dwarfed or marginalized, and we are not a part or a province of 
another country', and that 'there is one country on each side' (Taipei T imes ,  4 August 
2002). His rhetoric is much stronger and held little room for negotiating a future 
one-China. 
I am referring to the event when President Bush 'chastized' Chen for wanting to 
'change the status quo unilaterally'. This took place during a joint press conference 
with PRC's Premier Wen Jiabao on 9 December 2003. 
I have written on this topic in a different article (see Chang 2003) In this paper I will 
only outline and address the key points of the early phase of Taiwanese nationalism. 
The point is that present-day Taiwanese nationalism is different from the earlier 
one in both discourse and strategies. But the past can always help to explain and 
rationalize present political actions. In this regard, the past serves to influence the 
present. 
l0 Wu Zhuoliu (1900-76) was a Taiwanese writer who grew up under Japanese rule, 
his most famous novel being T h e  Ol-phan o f A s i a  (1956). It is a first-hand account 
of a Taiwanese youth who found himself stranded in a hostile world shaped by a 
variety of influences: Japanese colonialism, Chinese nationalism, traditionalism and 
enlightenment. The main protagonist of the novel went insane and finally committed 
suicide. The novel has recently been translated into English (see Wu 2005). 
l1 The Japanese government reported that about 17,000 young men who had competed 
to meet the rigorous screening to join the ranks of voluntary soldiers. One of them, 
now listed in the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, was the elder brother of Taiwan's former 
president, Lee Teng-hui. The total number of Taiwanese that served in the Japanese 
military units, either voluntarily or drafted, reached 200,000 or more. 
l* For many Taiwanese independence supporters, Taiwan was not returned to China, 
but was occupied by China. The legality for the 'return' to the motherland is based 
on the Portsmouth Declaration (August 1945), which supported the Cairo Confer- 
ence Agreement (December 1943), which stated that territories such as Manchuria, 
Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands, which had been 'stolen' from China by Japan, 
should be returned to China. But Taiwan independence advocates who aEgui for 
'Taiwan status undecided' suggest that these declarations were not ratified by the 
more formal and more comprehensive San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951. 
That peace treaty stated that Japan should renounce its previous occupied territo- 
ries but did not specify to whom they should be returned. This was caused by the 
turmoil and political uncertainty associated with the civil war in China. 
l3 For an apologetic account of the incident, from the government's perspective, see 
Lai Tse-han e t  al. (1991). 
'"n 28 February 2004 an estimated one and half million people in Taiwan turned 
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out to form a human chain to express their 'love for Taiwan', and the need for 'self- 
salvaging' to commemorate their previous sufferings. The high turnout was also 
triggered by a very intensive presidential campaign between the pro-independence 
candidates of the DPP and the anti-independence candidates of the other camp. 
l' The last major battle fought between the PRC and the ROC was in 1958, when Que- 
moy  i in-men) was besieged with heavy shelling. 
l6 TO compensate its breach of the security of Taiwan, and the potential loss in the 
region, the US passed the Taizuan Relations Act in 1979 very swiftly. The Act is de- 
fined as a domestic law, prescribing the US responsibility toward Taiwan's defence 
capability and its need for prosperity and development. Today, this Act is regarded 
as one of the cornerstones of US diplomacy in dealing with both the PRC and Tai- 
wan, despite its public acknowledgement of the 'One-China policy' (see Metzger 
and Mvers 1996). 
l7 Forty-five arrests were made. Eight of those arrested were sent to military court on 
charges of treason. These eight received heavier sentences ranging from 12 years to 
lifetime imprisonment. 
Is Readers can consult Hsiau (2000) for an exposition of the significance of the incident 
on the rise of Taiwanese sentiments. 
l9 In that year the Taiwanese government abolished the infamous 'Criminal Law Article 
loo', which had provided the legal basis for charging with treason against those 
giving speeches and organizing for Taiwan's independence. 
20 Taiwan began its first 'supplementary' election in 1969. Members elected were still 
given life-long guarantee for the posts they won, but this was modified in 1972. 
Unlike the older members, all 'supplementary' members were now given limited 
terms of office and subjected to relelection. 
21 There are at least two useful sources for comprehensive analysis on this subject: Tien 
(1996) and Wu (1995). 
22 Take the Legislature Yuan (the most influential representative body in real politics 
in the ROC constitution). For example, even in 1989, the newly elected Legislature 
members occupied less than one-third of the seats. 
23 'Long Live the Election' was a title of a book written by a well-known opposition 
leader Hsu Hsin-Liang in 1979. He was campaigning for the importance and mo- 
rality of having fair and large-scale elections. More importantly, he described the 
strategy to challenge the authoritarian government by using 'edging toward close 
to violence' tactics; by which he meant using mass rally and legal campaign tactics 
as much as possible until violent clashes were about to happen. 
2"t should not be lost sight of that even in 2004, when the DPP had been the 'ruling 
party' of Taiwan for four years, it still could not manage to win a decisive major- 
ity. 
2' In January 1979, Ye Jianying (1897-1986) gave an important speech on terms for 
peaceful unification with Taiwan (dubbed the 'Nine Points'), immediately after 
China and the US had established formal didomatic relation. 
26 Lee was not Chiang's 'unquestioned' heir, according to Lee's own interpretation 
(Lee, Teng-hui 2004). The fact is that Chiang let Lee succeed him as vice-president 
by default, and left other matters open to interpretation and struggle without any 
clear instructions. 
27 This refers to 'Decision Statement item 417', stating the 'Four Ifs': the DPP will 
advocate Taiwan independence if KMT and the CCP join for unification talks by 
themselves; if the KMT sell out the interests of Taiwanese people; if the CCP unify 
Taiwan; and if the KMT refuses to implement true democracy in Taiwan. 
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28 Lee admitted in 1994 that he thought of himself as Japanese until he was 20 years 
old. This confession quite angered his Mainlander opponents from both sides of 
Taiwan Strait. 
29 Lee won with 54 percent of the vote. Peng Ming-min of the DPP, the closest con- 
tender, received 21.1 percent of the vote. About 25 percent of the votes supported 
other independent candidates. 
30 Some critics will say that this period was also the high tide for 'black-gold' politics, 
meaning rent-seeking behaviour by politicians through illegal means such as inside 
information and privileged financial practices. Losing the moral high ground in 
ruling Taiwan, the KMT became reliant on corrupt politicians and cronies to win 
seats in the Legislature to maintain its political majority. 
31 After his forced resignation from the KMT party, Lee Teng-hui switched from ex-KMT 
party chairman to become the prime spokesman for Taiwanese independence. He 
also accepted the role of honorary chairman of the newly formed Taiwanese party, 
the Taiwan Solidarity Party, which has been both a strong ally and a competitor of 
the DPP. 
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